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Abstract 
Over the last decade economic integration has advanced in both areas, and this has been seen as 
an opportunity for real convergence in Latin America and in the European periphery. But our 
approach emphasises that integration has to be supplemented by macroeconomic stability and 
structural reform. Focusing on these aspects, this work compares both experiences which, while 
very diverse in nature, depth and scope, may however offer through their differences and 
analogies interesting insights, especially for Latin America, as the degree of integration in Europe 
is much more advanced. The conclusions point to the need for a further effort in Latin America to 
achieve the fruits of reasonable policies, in order to compensate for the robust institutional 
underpinnings from which the European periphery has benefited. Thus, at the current juncture, as 
Latin America looks back with mixed feelings on the past decade, perseverance and determination 
in pursuing reforms are called for. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade economic integration has advanced in both Latin America and Europe. 
Integration, encompassing trade and capital openness, has been seen in Latin America and in the 
European periphery2 as a recipe for growth and real convergence with the more developed 
countries (more precisely with the United States for Latin America and the core European 
countries for the EU periphery). In the light of the European, and also the Latin American 
experience, this view is probably too simplistic (chart 1). Integration could indeed be considered as 
an important catalyst for real convergence, but on the other hand, the opening up of the trade and 
                                                
2 The term “European periphery” is used here in an admittedly loose sense, meaning countries physically distant from 
the core, which in general (but not always) joined the EU at a later stage and lagged behind the core countries in terms 
of GDP per capita, nominal stability and capital endowment, 
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capital account may entail an increase in exposure and therefore in the potential vulnerability of 
the economies in question. In any case, economic integration will only lead to real convergence 
when complemented with other elements that can be grouped under two headings: 
macroeconomic stability and an adequate structural setting. Macroeconomic stability requires a 
framework to maintain policy discipline, so as to counterbalance the potential increase in 
vulnerability and to allow for growth to be steady and sustainable. An adequate structural setting, 
defined by the observance and endurance of market principles, a consistent regulatory framework 
and the flexibility of the economy, shapes a stable environment to attract a continuous flow of 
capitals and to consolidate the functioning of the economy, thus contributing to create the 
conditions for sustainable growth. 
The European integration process, in particular the experience of those peripheral countries in 
Europe, has attracted the interest of Latin America countries3. And in return, the potential and 
                                                
3 It could be argued, and indeed this paper stresses the point, that only North-South type integration processes exhibit 
some analogies to the periphery in Europe. 
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modalities of Latin American integration are of increasing interest to Europe.  
At first sight, both experiences are quite different in nature. For instance, the process in Latin 
America has advanced very rapidly on all the fronts considered (trade integration, macro stability 
and structural setting) since the late eighties, but it is devoid of sound institutional underpinnings. 
On the contrary, the European process has been lengthy and uneven, and it has tended to focus 
first on trade integration, then on macro stability –including exchange rate stability- and, more 
recently, on structural reforms. In the meantime a dense, imbricate and very robust institutional 
structure has been set in place which has sustained and reinforced the whole process.  
Now that Europe has reached an important milestone in the integration process with the 
introduction of euro notes and coins, and that in Latin America there seem to be mixed feelings 
over the results of a decade of integration and reforms, a comparison of the respective processes 
would be particularly timely. Thus, this paper aims to study these experiences which, while very 
diverse in nature, depth and scope, may however offer through their differences and analogies 
interesting insights, especially for Latin America, as the degree of integration in Europe is much 
more advanced. 
In order to frame our discussion, a summary comparison of the economic outcomes of both 
processes is displayed in the following graphs, focusing on the last two decades: 
Integration (graphs 1): The outcome was quite similar in general for the new entrants in the EU in 
the eighties and for Latin America. Openness in the economy and capital flows increased 
substantially, and at much higher rates than the reference countries (EU as a whole, and the 
US/OECD, respectively) in both regions. Moreover, trade within the region has tended in general 
to increase as a share of total trade. 
Macro-economic stability (graphs 2): The results are more diverse here. The process of 
nominal convergence did accelerate in the latter years in Europe, against the background of the 
EMU-required convergence criteria (inflation, deficit, debt, exchange rate stability, long-term 
interest rates). The reduction in macro imbalances, especially on the price stability and fiscal 
fronts, enjoyed a conclusive boost in the second half of the nineties. In Latin America the headway 
has been remarkable in price stability. In terms of fiscal discipline, after drastic stabilisation in the 
late eighties there has been some slippage, which has been corrected in the last couple of years. 
However, spreads on debt, which diminished dramatically in the European periphery, have 
followed an uneven trend in Latin America due to the sequence of financial crises in emerging 
markets. Also, the contrast in exchange rate stability reflects the process of locking of exchange 
rates prior to EMU, starting around 1995, and the exchange rate crises and drift towards floating 
regimes in Latin America. 
Structural setting (graph 3): The European periphery made decisive progress over recent years 
in the structural framework of the economy as reflected in the competitiveness scoreboard 
displayed 
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 in the figure4. The picture in Latin America is more diverse. The region as such has stalled but 
there have been advances in recent years in some countries. 
Real convergence (graphs 4): The European periphery experience shows that the process of 
real convergence is not necessarily sustained. It accelerated around the entry dates due to the 
beneficial effects of the opening up of the economy, but it suffered setbacks (as a case in point, 
after the EMS crises). In the final years the process acquired fresh momentum in most countries. 
A similar lesson can be drawn from Latin America, which converged in the first half of the nineties 
but saw this process reversed in the second half, in the wake of financial crises.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the European experience, focusing on the 
European periphery (and in particular the Spanish experience), is reviewed, stressing the main 
lessons and insights of the process. In section 3 a similar evaluation of the Latin American 
experience to date is made. Section 4 draws and develops the main conclusions of the analysis. 
                                                
4 The competitiveness scoreboard of the IMD attempts to capture in a synthetic indicator the relative competitiveness 
position (understood broadly as conditions for future growth) of the economy by focusing mainly on a set of structural 
indicators related to the business, government and productivity environment. 
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2. The European experience (with special reference to peripheral countries) 
2.1. Comprehensive integration process  
The introduction of euro banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002 marked a milestone in the 
process of European monetary integration, in which the decisive step was taken three years 
earlier, in January 1999, with the creation of the euro and the establishment of a single monetary 
policy. The pace of integration has been uneven and the process very long. Periods of rapid 
advancement have been followed by periods of stagnation. Table 15 shows the main steps to 
monetary union, which are described in Annex 1. In the early fifties, the will to create a common 
market was undoubtedly related to the legacy of two terrible world wars. It has taken more than 
forty years since the establishment of the European Economic Community to arrive at the present 
juncture and progress, characterised by a gradual deepening of economic and monetary co-
operation, has not been free from crises. Having identified the main steps to monetary union, there 
appear to have been two key moments at which the process of integration was given special 
impetus. First, in the mid-eighties, when France decided to give priority to a stable exchange rate 
between the French franc and the Deutsche mark and hence to price stability, which was 
Germany´s main policy objective. This followed a proposal for greater political co-operation and a 
deepening of integration, which led to the Delors Plan and the Single Market as the way forward 
for the European project. And second, in the mid-nineties, when the peripheral countries, after the 
severe EMS crises, made real headway in attaining the macroeconomic stability imposed as a 
condition for joining the euro area. 
                                                
5 From Bergeij, Berndsen and Jansen (2000) 
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Economic interdependence among EU Member States, as measured by the scale of intra-
European trade, has grown considerably. The share of intra-EU trade as a percentage of total 
foreign trade rose from 40 per cent in the early 1960s to around 60 per cent in 2000 (see graph 
1A). As regards capital markets, they were completely liberalised in June 1990 in the core 
countries and between 1992 and 1994 in the periphery. The process was gradual but not smooth, 
in that some countries, such as Spain (as will be explained later) underwent some reversals. Also, 
to put this ambitious economic integration program into effect, a full, complex, institutional and 
legal apparatus capable of creating binding legislation was set up. For this purpose, the EU 
created a number of truly European institutions, including the European Commission, the Council 
of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central 
Bank. The competences of all these institutions increased as the integration process advanced. 
Table 26 shows that the EU has become much more than an area of free trade and policy co-
ordination. It also presents a list of policy responsibilities that have been transferred to central EU 
                                                
6 From Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) 
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institutions and indicates the extent of EU involvement in each policy area (extensive, shared with 
national governments and limited). This table shows that European institutions have acquired 
responsibilities in a host of policy areas, including some that have little to do with fostering intra-EU 
trade or economic integration. On some issues, such as monetary policy and international trade 
policy, there has been a complete transfer of sovereignty and the supranational level has exclusive 
Table 2  Policy responsibilities of the EU and their scope
Extensive Shared Limited
Economic and social areas
X
 
Competition X  
Cultural policy X 
Regional policy X  
Employment and social policy X  
Enterprise policy X  
Equal opportunities X  
Industrial policy X  
Public health X 
Solidarity/welfare X 
Consumer policy X  
Monetary policy X  
Education, training and youth X 
Environment X  
Internal market X  
Research technology X  
Trans European networks/mobility X 
Sectoral policies
Agriculture X  
Fisheries X  
Transportation X  
Information and telecommunications
Audiovisual policy X
Energy X  
External policies
Common foreign and security policy X
Development policy X  
Humanitarian aid X  
Common trade policy X  
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competence. It should also be pointed out that on many occasions the supranational nature of 
Community law has entailed tensions between the Member States, and conflicts within the 
Community institutions. The start of Stage Three of EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) in 1999 
could be considered as the most important step in the process of sovereignty transfer. This was 
the culmination of a process embarked upon in 1989 with the approval of the Delors Report at the 
Madrid European Summit.  
2.2. Macroeconomic stability 
EMU has been designed as an area of macroeconomic stability, in the sense that the entry 
conditions and the institutional set-up are geared towards avoiding macroeconomic imbalances. In 
this respect the advances made in the second half of the nineties by the peripheral countries, 
traditionally characterised by weak fundamentals, have been especially relevant. In these 
countries the consequences of integration have been experienced more intensely and the related 
transformations have been particularly rapid and far-reaching.  
When the peripheral countries embarked on 
the process of European integration, their 
economic model was not unequivocally 
based on openness, free markets and 
macroeconomic stability, the basic pillars of 
integration. Internal resistance to economic 
liberalisation and more flexible markets was 
accompanied by scant appreciation of the 
inherent value of macroeconomic stability. 
Moreover, in the case of Spain (the largest 
of the peripheral countries), which only 
gradually emerged from a state of autarky 
from the sixties onwards, democratic 
consolidation, the need to improve the 
welfare state, industrial restructuring and 
political devolution led to a significant 
increase in public spending, which was not 
matched by a similar increase in tax 
revenue, despite the fiscal reform that came 
into force in 1978. Additionally, the social 
unrest following the change in political 
regime led to sizeable wage rises. Supply 
rigidities and demand pressures also 
contributed to significant increases in 
inflation.  
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
GDP GRO W TH
G R
SP
IR
% %
PT
UE
   Sources: Am eco, Eurostat and IM F.
M acroeconom ic stability
GRAPH 5
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
SP
G R
IR
(Right hand)
REAL EXHANGE RATE
PT
  12
The change of course required in the peripheral countries to adopt the patterns of behaviour 
imposed by European integration had to be achieved in a very demanding environment. This was 
due to the intensity of integration and to its timing: the peripheral countries joined the EU at a time 
the integration process was accelerating, in particular in the monetary sphere. The EMU project 
imposed some particularly strict requirements, even for economies with a greater tradition of 
stability. Spain, like the other peripheral countries, not only had to join this race from a particularly 
distant starting point because of its particular situation (explained in the paragraph above); it also 
had to pursue a moving target that became more demanding the closer it came. The road was an 
arduous one and Spain was sometimes moving in the wrong direction. Such a loss of ground was 
particularly serious when an unbalanced policy mix was applied as a result of expansionary pro-
cyclical budgets that contributed to fostering excessive capital inflows, putting pressure on the 
current account and over-burdening monetary policy with tasks it could not achieve on its own. 
Two periods from the recent past of the Spanish economy illustrate this point:  
1. -EU entry (1986). The gradual dismantling of exchange controls and the unbalanced policy-mix 
led to a vicious circle. Capital attracted by Spain's growth potential and the high prevailing interest 
rates fuelled excessive monetary growth. The attempts to sterilise it, in the face of inflationary 
risks, prompted fresh rises in interest rates, which in turn attracted more foreign capital, and so on. 
This self-sustaining process was particularly virulent in 1987. The authorities raised interest rates 
to hitherto unknown levels, but this was not enough to contain either the growth of the monetary 
aggregate (the demand for which was, moreover, prone to marked instability at that time owing to 
financial innovation) or inflationary pressures, and it merely refuelled capital inflows and the 
strength of the exchange rate. Finally, the authorities were obliged to lower interest rates and 
reintroduce capital controls, which, contrary to traditional ones, sought to deter the short-term 
capital inflows that were distorting monetary policy implementation. Had fiscal policy been tighter, 
monetary policy could have been eased somewhat, with an alleviation of exchange rate tensions. 
EU entry therefore exposed the unsustainability of the macroeconomic strategy of the mid-
eighties.  
2. -The ERM crisis (1992-1993). In 1992 the Spanish economy began to show signs of 
sluggishness after an exceptionally long-lasting and intense upturn. At the same time, February 
1992 saw the dismantling of the last exchange controls on both capital inflows and outflows, 
eleven months ahead of schedule. The ERM crisis was the outcome of a combination of several 
factors: the doubts about the future of EMU which arose in the wake of the negative outcome of 
the Danish referendum in June 1992 and were exacerbated in the run-up to the French 
referendum in September that same year; the loss of competitiveness suffered in the countries 
where nominal convergence had not advanced enough (see graph 5), after more than five years 
without realignments of the parities in the ERM (the so-called “hard ERM”, which was wrongly 
seen at the time as a quasi-monetary union); the outcome of German unification, which first 
induced a prolongation of the cyclical upswing in Germany, whereas the rest of Europe was 
undergoing a sharp slowdown, and second, an unbalanced policy mix in Germany; and, finally, the 
numerous contagion effects between countries prompted the onset of the crisis and fuelled its 
persistence. The crisis caused the withdrawal in late 1992 of sterling and the lira from the ERM, 
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and the abandonment by the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish currencies of their unilateral links 
with the ECU. Numerous realignments also ensued, including the devaluations of the peseta in 
September and November 1992 and April 19937. However, market doubts about the preparedness 
and ability of EU countries' authorities to raise interest rates in defence of exchange rates in cases 
where such policies might clash with the requirements of the domestic economy led to new 
pressures within the ERM. As a result, in August 1993, the finance ministers and central bank 
governors of the Member States decided to widen temporarily the fluctuation bands within the 
exchange rate mechanism of the ERM to 15 per cent, while maintaining the existing central rates. 
The widening of the bands contributed to restoring exchange rate stability in the ERM, by 
lessening the focus for speculative attacks. The size of the macroeconomic imbalances was the 
main cause of the peseta devaluation: the public deficit was huge and the trade balance deficit 
mirrored the economy's lack of competitiveness. The devaluations addressed the latter problem 
and boosted activity, but the consequences of the whole episode in terms of capital stock and 
unemployment were very significant.  
In subsequent years the discipline imposed by the requirements to move forward with European 
integration, reflected in the convergence criteria8 and the lessons drawn from previous periods, 
resulted in a more balanced policy mix in Spain, which enabled economic recovery to take place 
without inflationary pressures. The confidence of economic agents in the resolve to control 
inflation, related among other factors to the enactment of the independence of the Banco de 
España in 1994 and the subsequent change in the monetary policy strategy towards inflation 
targeting, was crucial in this respect, leading to a moderation of inflation expectations and wage 
demands. It should be noted that the peripheral countries had strong incentives to achieve and 
maintain nominal stability. As has been pointed out above, their economic progress has 
traditionally been constrained by their propensity for instability (even after EU accession), which 
had periodically induced crises and reversals. For the same reason, these were the countries that 
had most to gain from the low and stable inflation rates that EMU was supposed to bring, whereas 
the core countries, which had been able to achieve price stability by themselves, had fewer 
incentives from this viewpoint (although there were other incentives for EMU in their case, related 
in particular to the deepening of the Single Market)9. Another interesting aspect of nominal 
convergence in EMU was the role played by emulation in creating incentives for appropriate 
policies in peripheral countries. The key role played by German monetary policy in consolidating 
price stability as the primary goal of European monetary policies in the run-up to EMU has been 
mentioned above. Emulation also played a role in terms of “peer-pressure” among European 
countries, in the sense that the costs of indiscipline rose perceptibly as an increasing number of 
countries achieved nominal stability. In the run-up to EMU, the political embarrassment of being 
“left behind” also played a positive role for some peripheral countries. 
                                                
7 The peseta was devalued again in March 1995, but in a rather different context characterised by the aftermath of the 
Mexican crises and the ensuing dollar weakness. 
8 In Banco de España (1997) there is a detailed explanation of the convergence criteria. 
9 It is interesting to note in this regard that polls on popular support for EMU in the run-up to the euro systematically 
showed a positive correlation between such support and historical inflation rates. 
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2.3. Structural setting  
Despite the fact that the market integration process made it increasingly necessary to advance in 
the structural setting, only in recent years has the latter improved significantly in the euro area 
countries and, in particular, in the peripheral ones. This was due to a lack of liberalisation and the 
high degree of rigidities previously characterising those countries. The willingness to ensure 
competitive conditions within the common market, to harmonise national law to ensure its proper 
functioning and the creation of a European Social Fund were already proposed as objectives in the 
Treaty of Rome (1958). However, progress in these areas has been very slow, despite the political 
will reflected in the White Paper on the internal market, presented by the Commission in 1985, the 
Single European Act which came into force in 1987 and, finally, the Treaty on European Union 
signed in Maastricht in 1992. The recent advance in enhancing the structural setting is related to 
Monetary Union. At the same time that Monetary Union has entailed the application of a common 
monetary policy for all the countries that have adopted the euro, European economic integration 
has given rise to greater co-ordination of the other strands of economic policy that remain under 
national sovereignty and have become the main tools for nominal convergence. This co-ordination 
has taken the form of public adoption of fiscal policy and structural reform objectives by each 
Member State and the supervision of their fulfillment through joint monitoring of the progress 
made. The main instrument of co-ordination is the so-called Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG). These are established annually and supplemented, in the fiscal sphere, by the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure as part of the Stability and Growth Pact, and by the progress reports on reforms 
in the markets for goods, labour and capital. In this sense, many measures that have been taken 
in Spain and other peripheral countries to improve the competitive environment have been 
introduced in line with the schedule laid down by Community directives. This means that, for Spain 
and for other European countries, becoming a EU member has prompted the introduction of many 
liberalising measures that might otherwise have been postponed. Additionally, references to the 
need to improve competition in order to benefit from the integration process was used from time to 
time by some governments to seek the social consensus to implement structural measures. The 
following paragraphs review the progress made in relation to the structural setting. First, the 
progress made in the context of the euro area on structural reform policies is assessed. And 
second, drawing on a number of indicators, the advances in aspects related to social 
enhancement are highlighted. 
Competition in product markets10  
For the Single Market to be more than just a customs union, it has been necessary not only to 
dismantle physical obstacles to the free circulation of goods but also technical and fiscal barriers, 
aligning the laws of the member countries, liberalising markets for services and opening up public 
markets. Progress on these aspects has been slow. Important, in this respect, have been the 
initiatives aimed at enhancing product market integration included in the successive action plans 
adopted in recent years by the Council, such as the 1997 Single Market Action Plan, which urged 
                                                
10 Based on OECD (2001) 
  15
improvements in the rules governing public procurement and the setting of technical standards. 
This stressed that state aid and differences in taxation create distortions and are potentially 
detrimental to cross-border trade in goods and services. The Helsinki European Council of 
December 1999 endorsed a new Internal Market Strategy, which outlined key objectives for the 
next five years and set up mechanisms for tracking and updating target actions. The 2000 Council 
review of this new strategy showed that, notwithstanding substantial progress in some areas, 
overall a lot remained to be done. The introduction of the euro as a common currency for the 
twelve euro area countries will boost competition in the euro area by smoothing trade and 
improving market transparency. 
Financial markets 
European financial markets are far more integrated than a decade ago. The advent of the euro 
has effectively created a single money market. However, markets for longer-term finance, 
including venture capital, remain fragmented, notwithstanding the proliferation of pan-European 
stock indices and more or less successful joint undertakings between various stock exchanges. 
Merger and acquisition activity in the banking sector has intensified, but largely within rather than 
across borders. At the same time, accounting standards, listing and prospectus requirements, as 
well as rules governing occupational pension funds and collateral, continue to differ widely across 
Member States, to the detriment of firms’ ability to raise funds or expand EU-wide. On top of the 
various Banking Directives in the last decades, a Financial Services Action Plan was launched in 
1999 to give financial market integration renewed impetus, which the EU Council in Lisbon 
pledged to implement in full by 2005. Some progress has been achieved. For example, agreement 
has been reached on a European company statute, which will allow a firm with subsidiaries in 
several Member States to operate under a single legal regime. Given the pace of transformation of 
the financial landscape and the time it takes for EU directives to be agreed by the Council and 
then implemented, there is a need to accelerate reforms in this area. Against this background, a 
Committee of “Wise Men” issued last year a set of useful recommendations, the Lamfalussy 
Report, to improve the EU securities markets’ regulatory framework11. 
Labour market 
Headway in this area has been prompted not so much by Community law, as in the case of goods 
and services and the financial markets, but rather by the conviction of member countries as to the 
positive effects that improvements in this field have on price determination in the economy, 
employment and its growth potential. In particular, in most euro area countries, the employment 
rate remains far below the level in the United States or in the Nordic countries, suggesting that 
there is room aplenty to lift potential output and growth. The vigorous job creation witnessed in the 
last few years partly reflects the measures taken by Member States during the 1990s to lower the 
cost of labour and/or to raise real wage flexibility. Sustained wage moderation, helped by cuts in 
social security contributions and taxes, played an important role. Spain is a clear example in this 
                                                
11 See Committee of Wise Men (2001) 
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respect. Labour markets have also tended to become more flexible, as witnessed by the large 
contribution of part-time and temporary 
employment to overall job creation. 
Notwithstanding, policy initiatives on the benefit 
side are still insufficient in some countries. It is also 
necessary to improve incentives to take up work, 
via the review and, where appropriate, reform of 
benefit, tax and training systems.  
Human & social capital enhancement 
There are few doubts that the accumulation of 
social capital (understood as investment in 
education, health and infrastructure) is not only a 
catalyst for social cohesion but also a basis for 
sustained growth and convergence. The 
improvements in these fields in Spain and other 
peripheral countries have been impressive. In 
recent decades the advances in gross fixed capital 
formation and social expenditure, including 
spending on health and education12, have been 
notable (see graph 6). In the peripheral countries, 
much of this progress was made possible by the 
fiscal reforms adopted and the consequent 
widening of tax bases. All this enabled advances in 
terms of social capital enhancement and income 
distribution. Nonetheless, Spain still has a long way 
to go when comparing with EU levels. It is true, 
again, that the integration process has helped 
social enhancement in Spain and in other 
peripheral countries due to the basic EU budget 
objective of reinforcing the economic and social 
cohesion of the Member States through transfers to 
the less developed countries and regions. Notable 
among the funds received are the European 
Regional Development Fund, aimed at developing 
infrastructures; the European Social Fund, for job 
training and guidance and for services and 
technical advice related to job creation; and the 
                                                
12In Banco de España (2001) there is an explanation about the methodology and sources used to obtain these 
indicators. 
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Cohesion Fund, for environmental and transport 
infrastructure projects. These funds accounted for 
around 5% of gross fixed capital investment on 
average in the nineties for the peripheral 
countries. 
Despite the progress made in Europe in relation to 
the structural setting, there is some way to go still 
for both Spain and the euro area in general. In 
particular, there are two reasons behind the need 
for further advances in structural reforms in EMU. 
The first is the lack of economic dynamism in the 
euro area as reflected in relatively low growth 
rates of production and productivity, and a 
comparatively low level of innovation, in particular 
when compared with the US. The European model 
is characterised by a high degree of social 
cohesion and equality but is far from optimal in 
terms of flexibility and the capacity for innovation. 
The second reason is the need to improve the 
ability of the euro area economy to adjust to 
shocks. Adjustment processes in product and 
labour markets in Europe are traditionally very 
slow and prolonged. The need for flexibility is 
particularly crucial following the adoption of a 
single currency, since adjustment via the 
exchange rate is no longer possible. 
2.4. Real convergence. 
As a result of the sustained pursuit of stability-
oriented macroeconomic policies, together with 
determined structural reform measures to increase 
market flexibility, Spain and the peripheral 
countries in general have been able to reduce 
inflation rates and inflation expectations and, at 
the same time, to make progress in real 
convergence. Real and nominal convergence 
should be seen as complementary and should be 
pursued in parallel. In fact, the Spanish economy 
regained the path of real convergence towards 
European levels of welfare following EU entry, 
which ended a period of 10 years of decline in its 
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relative welfare. As can be seen in graph 713, the peripheral EU countries in general tended to 
catch up in terms of GDP per capita with the EU average over the last 20 years, although the 
process was uneven, with frequent slippage, and the final results differ considerably across 
countries. The shift in the relative position of Ireland in the 90s (from GDP per capita 25% below 
the EU average to more than 25% above) is particularly remarkable. Close examination of this 
convergence process in the case of Spain shows that, in recent years, the path of convergence 
towards European levels of welfare has been regained as a consequence of the intensity of job 
creation, while Spain has continued to lag behind in terms of labour productivity, mainly because 
of its relatively modest total factor productivity (TFP) growth. This fact illustrates the need, already 
referred to in the structural setting section, to increase the stock of physical, technological and 
human capital. This need exists in all European countries, but especially in the peripheral ones 
that have yet to catch up.  
Another way to view the real convergence process is in terms of competitiveness, defined broadly, 
as the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) does. Competitiveness is the 
ability of a nation to create an environment conducive to sustained value added creation. 
According to this information, Portugal and, especially, Greece and Spain have advanced notably 
in recent years on the world competitiveness scoreboard. In particular, between 1996-1998 and 
2000-2002, Spain has moved from 27th position to 23rd, Greece from 37th to 32nd and Portugal 
has remained at 32nd, although these rankings are still far from the EU average. As a conclusion 
to the foregoing paragraphs, the macroeconomic stability and reforms arising from the EU 
integration process have been extraordinarily beneficial to the Spanish economy and to other 
peripheral countries, and have been reflected in improvements in real convergence. However, 
convergence was not an automatic result of integration. Although integration and the 
accompanying institutional setting were extremely useful, nominal and real convergence targets 
were only achieved when the right policies were adopted and implemented.  
3. Evaluation of the process in Latin America 
The recent process of integration in Latin America cannot be disentangled from the broad policy 
regime shift that has taken place during the late eighties. As in the case of the European 
periphery, the diversity of experiences of Latin America countries warrants a note of caution. A 
conscious effort has been made to underline the common traits, without much specific reference 
to particular cases; therefore, the generalisations made in this section should be taken as 
corresponding to very broad general trends in the region.  
3.1. Limited integration 
After the debt crises that erupted in 1982 and some years of economic turmoil in the aftermath, 
little by little the need for a new economic model took hold in the policymakers of the region. By 
the end of the eighties, the programmes of economic stabilisation and reform spread through the 
                                                
13 See footnote 12 
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region in different waves, and they fostered the process of economic integration, which remained 
basically regional in the sphere of trade, but which was global in the capital markets. 
Regarding trade, back in the sixties there were several initiatives, such as LAFTA (ALALC in 
Spanish), to increase trade integration, but they did not achieve any relevant results. The nineties, 
on the contrary, saw a great boost to the process of trade integration (as table 3 illustrates). 
Especially relevant were the founding of Mercosur (1991) and the North American Free Trade 
Area –NAFTA- (1994). The reshuffling of the Andean Pact in 1991, the CARICOMs Agreements 
among Caribbean countries and, finally, the multiplicity of bilateral or ad hoc pacts (more than 
twenty), to which Chile was one of the main subscribers, complete the broad picture of regional 
integration agreements. Deeper trade integration brought about an overall cut in tariffs (from 
41.6% in the eighties to around 10% now), non-tariff restrictions (from 37.6% to just 6% of 
imports) and exports subsidies, which has favored a substantial increase in trade and openness in 
the region, as observed in graph 1B. Latin America has in fact become the most dynamic export 
region after East Asia in the nineties, with annual growth of more than 10%. However, the impulse 
concentrated to a significant extent in Mexico (+20%) and extended to other Central American 
countries as a result of NAFTA and “maquiladora” (offshore processing and re-export) 
agreements.  
Note that two types of integration processes currently coexist in the region, whose ambition and 
scope differ: a South-South model (represented prominently by Mercosur) and a North-South 
model (e.g NAFTA). Mercosur aimed at a deeper degree of integration and was devised as a 
common market (free trade area plus common external tariff), where there have been attempts at 
economic policy co-ordination, such as the establishment of a convergence policy at the 
Florianopolis Summit in 2000. However, even on the trade front, the institutional framework 
remains loose, since there is  not yet any effective institution to settle trade disputes, or a common 
position on trade to deal with other partners; moreover, economic divergences, the differences in 
the evolution of exchange rates and the lack of a macroeconomic anchor within the system are 
probably additional hurdles to further integration. The ambition of Mercosur requires more intense 
and complex political negotiation among sovereign states. NAFTA is less ambitious in that it is 
limited to a free trade area, but it has a particular interest since it is one of the few examples of a 
genuinely free trade area between industrial and emerging countries (North-South integration). 
This has boosted manufacturing exchanges in the form of “maquiladoras” between US and 
Mexico, which are behind the increase in intra-area trade seen in graph 1B. 
The quest for wider, if not deeper, integration retains its momentum in the sphere of trade, as 
shown by the commitment to a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA), agreed in 1995 and 
strengthened at the last Americas Summit in April 2001, with the undertaking that the FTAA 
become effective in 2005. However, very different views about the geometry, depth and nature of 
integration seem to persist in the region. 
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During the nineties Latin America saw a 
profound process of integration into the 
global capital markets. The restructuring of 
debt through the Brady Plan (1989) marked a 
turnaround, further impelled by the processes of 
capital account liberalisation which the reform 
programmes pursued14 at different speeds and 
depths. The dramatic increase in capital flows 
to the region observed in graph 8 meant a 
substantial change in structure. Portfolio flows 
(equity and bonds) became prominent in the 
early years, and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
surged strongly afterwards helped by the 
parallel process of privatisation (at the expense 
of official flows and syndicated bank loans). The 
magnitude of flows and, to some extent, the 
change in their composition (portfolio flows are 
intrinsically volatile) contributed, among other 
factors reviewed below, to increasing the 
vulnerability of LA countries, heavily relying on 
external financing. This fuelled a lively debate in 
the region on the optimal sequence of capital 
account liberalisation. There is some evidence 
that to fully reap the benefits of liberalisation 
and to mitigate the vulnerability of volatile 
capital flows, it is essential to build up first a 
sound and deep domestic financial system. 
Another debatable point is whether stabilisation 
plans which promise large short-term gains but 
are surrounded by medium-term uncertainties 
intrinsically favour excessive inflows, followed 
by sudden stops or reversals, and whether the 
current global financial architecture creates 
some perverse incentives which might reinforce 
these problems. 
                                                
14 Mexico or Argentina went very far and fast in liberalisation. Brazil and Colombia have followed a more paused and 
limited approach, while Chile, which opted for this same approach, has recently accelerated the process of financial 
liberalisation 
   Sources: IMF WEO database.
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3.2. Macroeconomic stability 
The programmes of reform and stabilisation applied in the nineties contributed to a substantial 
improvement in the macroeconomic environment in most of the region, as observed in graph 2B. 
Advances in price stability have been particularly notable: most countries are enjoying one-digit 
inflation rates, after many years of high inflation. As displayed in graph 9, in the initial phase of the 
process price stabilisation was in most cases achieved through the pegging of exchange rates, but 
since the second half of the decade all pegs have been abandoned (and the only fixers are those 
which adopted dollarisation of the economy: El Salvador, Ecuador). Among floaters, there has 
been a move towards the adoption of direct inflation targeting regimes and more autonomous 
central banks which may be considered, despite the difficulties, rather successful.  
Fiscal performance is more difficult to judge, due to the complete overhaul of fiscal accounts in 
the last decade. In any case, there is an increasing awareness that fiscal discipline is necessary to 
improve overall stability, although some hurdles to expenditure control remain, mostly in 
expansions. Despite the efforts made, fiscal policy has traditionally shown a pro-cyclical pattern 
(see graph 10): when the economy grows, increased fiscal receipts and access to external 
financing stimulate government expenditure, thus feeding additional growth and inflation; in bad 
times, lower tax receipts and greater difficulties for raising financing on international markets force 
budgetary retrenchment, in particular expenditure cuts, - which causes additional economic 
Source: own elaboration.
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contraction. This pro-cyclical bias is an additional 
source of volatility for macroeconomic policies, but 
experience shows that fiscal discipline can 
ultimately stimulate growth potential through a 
reduction of the risk premium in the economy. 
These advances in monetary and fiscal stability did 
not preclude financial instability. A major obstacle 
is that high levels of debt and interest rates for 
public finances impose, in general, a cumbersome 
external debt burden for the economy. The 
vulnerabilities associated with these burdens are 
heightened, respectively, by the narrow tax base 
and the limited openness of economies, which 
make debt service a heavy drag on the economy, 
as compared, for instance, to Asian countries (see 
graph 11). The opening up of the capital account, in 
combination with the stabilisation programs, 
prompted a surge in capital flows which sustained 
consumption and, to a lesser extent, investment 
booms, accumulating real and financial disequilibria 
in the economy which were reflected in a 
deterioration of activity and an overvaluation of the 
exchange rate (see graph 12). Also, the softening 
of the external constraint led, in some cases, to a 
certain relaxation of policies and a slowdown in 
reform. Finally, external investors failed to assess 
the situation in time and to discriminate among 
countries (although the markets’ capacity for 
discrimination seems to be improving of late). 
These ingredients were at the root of the series of 
financial crises which plagued Latin America after 
1994 and which spread to the region in the form of 
contagion. Financial crises have indeed been 
frequent and damaging. Arguably, vulnerability is to 
some extent unavoidable. Some of the structural 
traits of the region mean a high degree of 
vulnerability is entrenched, such as the debt burden 
mentioned above, but other traits have even deeper 
roots in the region. In particular, the large financing 
requirements in order to sustain the process of 
development and also other imbalances, 
   Sources: Martín Machuca (2001).
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compounded by the low rate of savings (which are, tellingly, much lower than in East Asia and 
even than in developed countries, as graph 13 displays), generate a large financing gap. This gap 
is moreover, financed in general by means of high interest rate spreads, due to the accumulated 
financial heterodoxy from the past and the resulting uncertainty. In addition, these large financing 
needs go together in many cases with a large share of foreign currency liabilities.  
In any case, this sensitivity to international financial markets’ sentiment means a sustained extra 
effort must be made to achieve the highest possible degree of economic discipline so as to reduce 
risk premia and, ultimately, the vulnerability of the economy.  
 
3.3. Structural reform and institutional strengthening15  
Reforms in Latin America have been far-reaching and have extended to all spheres of economic 
activity. According to some authors, like Rodrik (1996), Latin America has adopted more trade and 
financial liberalisation policies in recent years than the East Asian countries in three decades. 
                                                
15 This section partly builds on BID (2001) 
   Sources: IMF WEO database.
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Probably, the higher reliance on foreign capital has contributed to the impetus of the process. We 
follow the outline of the previous section, concentrating on four main areas of reform: economic 
liberalisation, financial markets, labour markets and social capital. 
Economic liberalisation 
Advances have been remarkable not only in the trade sphere (see above), although the delay in 
initiating the reforms still places Latin American countries behind on many measures of economic 
liberalisation. The laws and regulations to provide for the smooth functioning of market principles 
are in place. One of the most visible components of the strategy to reorganise the apparatus of the 
state, simplify government activities and enhance efficiency has been the extensive resort to 
privatisation. This has focused on utilities, telecommunications and the banking system. However, 
in practice, there are still many difficulties in effectively applying market principles. The main 
weaknesses are the fragility and scant effectiveness of public institutions, sometimes coupled with 
loopholes and a lack of means to enforce regulations. Unfortunately, in recent years, an additional 
risk is materialising in some countries of the region: the reversal of the regulatory framework and 
the infringement of property rights. This is a worrying development since it impinges on current 
activity and on future expectations by eroding trust.  
Financial markets 
The financial system in the region has undergone a complete turnaround16, as observed in graph 
14.  Several traits which constrained the financial system in the past have been modified: targeted-
credit programmes and interest rate controls have been mostly suppressed; reserve requirements, 
traditionally very high as an implicit tax on financial intermediation, have been reduced to below 
20%; international standards of regulation and supervision have been adopted; the share of public 
banks has dwindled, mostly through privatisation, and the share of foreign-owned banks has 
increased substantially, as shown in the same graph. This set of reforms provided for a significant 
increase in the bancarisation of the economy. The increasing stock of domestic debt, the 
development of domestic institutional investors (the mushrooming of private pension funds is the 
most relevant example of this), and more active and sophisticated debt and monetary 
management by the authorities is contributing to widening the base of the domestic capital and 
money markets, which nevertheless remain relatively small. These developments are positive, but 
there is still a long way to go to achieve a satisfactory level of financial development that 
encourages saving and allows for a better intermediation of resources, reducing external 
vulnerability. After all, there are still some important areas of improvement, and some of the 
advances (like the improvement of regulation or better screening of customers) may hamper credit 
growth in the short term. Moreover, as the crises in the decade testify, some banking systems in 
the region are still fragile, but experience shows that properly managed banking crises can be 
Schumpeterian, in the sense of setting the basis for a stronger financial system in the future. 
  27
Labour markets 
The labour market is the area where reforms have been less satisfactory. Only in a few countries 
has labour reform been significant. The main feature of many Latin American labour markets is 
their extreme duality. A formal sector where firing and non-wage costs are very high, well above 
those even in Europe in many cases, contrasts with an informal/underemployment sector which 
represents a large share of employment in many countries (graph 15), and which in a certain 
sense is very flexible. Therefore, an effort to increase the flexibility of the formal sector, coupled 
with well-defined incentives for the informal sector, would allow for a progressive integration of 
both, observing the principles of efficiency, flexibility and fairness.  
                                                                                                                                                            
16 See a more detailed analysis in Latin American financial development in perspective by Banco de España, also 
presented in this workshop. 
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Human and social capital enhancement  
Reducing the capital gap at all levels in Latin America is a key objective, not only in terms of 
private physical capital but also in terms of human capital (education) and infrastructure. The 
advances in the last decade have been important and positive, as graph 16 evidences in the case 
of education, but the effort must be sustained to bridge the still-large gap. The situation in terms of 
health standards and pension systems can in general be improved. These aspects, by 
themselves, would grant an essential role to public spending in Latin America in order to improve 
the stock of social capital, but the effects of the gaps in social capital also have a central impact on 
income distribution, poverty and social cohesion (see below).  
The increase in and better management of fiscal resources play a pivotal role in this context; 
hence the importance of extensive fiscal reforms to increase the fiscal base and streamline the tax 
structure. Some steps in this direction were taken in the decade. The tax system was thoroughly 
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overhauled: the share of tariff revenues shrank (from 29% to 16% in the nineties); VAT systems 
were adopted in many countries; marginal rates on profits were reduced and there were serious 
efforts to improve tax administration and revenue17. However, over recent years reforms have 
been stalling and the trend towards fiscal decentralisation, despite improved co-responsibility 
mechanisms in some cases, is creating some problems with severe consequences for the stability 
of certain countries. 
 
3.4. Real convergence 
The outcome of a decade of reforms can be judged as mixed. As reviewed, there have been 
substantial breakthroughs in many spheres, from macroeconomic stabilisation to the liberalisation 
of the economy, the improvement of the financial system and greater integration into world 
markets. Certain exceptions aside, these changes have hardly translated into advances in real 
convergence or a better distribution of income, and the goal of achieving a path of sustained 
growth has been jeopardised by the persistent vulnerability of the region to financial crises. 
Nonetheless, as we will emphasise in the next section, the culprit cannot be the reform process. 
Rather, as the cases of those early (Chile) or intense (Mexico) reformers show, reforms can be 
said to have not gone far enough, or to have not been comprehensive enough or to have had 
neither the conditions or time to take root. 
Regional growth stood at 3.3% in the nineties, a meagre 1.5% in per capita terms, which has in 
general not allowed for real convergence with the developed countries. Furthermore, this 
performance comes after a decade -the lost decade- of negative growth in per capita terms, which 
emphasises the unsatisfactory performance of the Latin American economies, taken as a whole.  
At the root of this outcome is productivity growth. Although labour productivity growth was 1.75% 
in annual terms during the past decade in the region, total factor productivity growth was 
substantially lower18. Only the Southern Cone economies, and the odd other country, recorded 
relevant growth in total factor productivity. This moderate outcome, in terms of labour productivity, 
is explained by the growth in employment, at an annual rate of around 1.7%, which has in any 
case had to cope with a large increase in the working age population (see graph 16). Therefore, 
given such a high demand for new jobs, advances in productivity are only possible with high and 
sustained rates of growth. 
Another worrying outcome of the decade of reforms in Latin America, given the lagged starting 
point, has been the scant progress in income distribution, mainly in the second half of the decade, 
highlighting the effects of the crises on low-range incomes (see graph 17). Arguably, extreme 
                                                
17 It could be argued that some of the fiscal reforms have had perverse effects on distribution, because some of the 
changes in taxes (reduction in marginal rates on income and profits, increase in indirect taxation) have had a regressive 
bias. This outcome should be compared with the positive effects on fiscal compliance that the reforms may have 
brought about.  
18 See IADB (2001) 
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differences in income have prevented the spreading of the middle classes in Latin America, thus 
eroding one of the most important bases for the cohesion and articulation of society and the 
chances of institutional consolidation. Addressing these issues more decisively would help to 
overcome some of the structural drags mentioned above, foster social and political stability, and 
reinforce the commitment to market principles and reforms. 
To all these elements we must add the competitiveness position of the LA economies. 
Competitiveness, defined broadly by the ‘quality of investment environment’ and which can be 
interpreted as a leading indicator of potential future growth, also put Latin America in a relatively 
low position as graph 3B illustrated, underscoring the sustained effort still to be made.  
4. Europe versus Latin America 
From the previous two sections it is clear that, while certain aspects of the European processes of 
integration and convergence (real and nominal) are somewhat similar to those in Latin America, 
other aspects are relatively specific to the European case and hardly applicable to other regions. 
In particular, differences are most pronounced in the institutional framework.Identifying both types 
of traits (common, on one hand, and specifically European, on the other) is essential in attempting 
to define the limits of the parallelisms and analogies between both areas. 
One of the most characteristic aspects of the European process is the existence of a well-defined 
incentives structure rooted in a robust institutional design. As shown in section 2, the European 
Union, throughout its almost half a century of history, has developed an institutional framework 
much stronger than any other free trade area in the world (it has even been criticised for being too 
bureaucratic). This confers strong institutional backing and soundness of framework on the EU, 
thereby helping consolidate advances. An international legal umbrella locks in the progress made, 
making reversals very unlikely (the other side of the coin obviously being a transfer of sovereignty 
to the supranational level). Strong institutional arrangements are deemed crucial to co-ordinate the 
process of reforms and real convergence. Given that Latin American countries lack the sort of 
framework that the European periphery enjoyed, persevering with a strong, decisive and 
continuous political impulse to proceed in terms of integration, stability and reforms becomes 
paramount, in spite of the fact that the risk of reversals is higher, since there is hardly any external 
device to lock in the gains made.  
Having closer and closer integration as an objective, the free market ideal firmly rooted in 
legislation and political co-operation as an increasingly ambitious target all contributed to 
strengthening European integration. It is certainly important to bear in mind that the European 
project was initiated more than fifty years ago, whereas Latin American integration is much more 
recent. Furthermore, there are differences in the sequence of trade integration, nominal 
convergence and structural reforms: whereas in Europe, roughly speaking, trade came first, 
nominal convergence later and structural reforms more recently (albeit with considerable 
overlapping and at a far from uniform pace), in Latin America the three took place more or less at 
the same time over the 90’s. In this regard, another difficulty in comparing both processes lies in 
the insufficient perspective for the case of Latin America. Despite this, the rest of this section 
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attempts to draw some lessons from the comparison between both areas in nominal convergence, 
structural reforms and real convergence.  
As integration proceeded, macroeconomic stability became an increasingly important policy 
objective. From a historical perspective, the relevance of macroeconomic stability as an economic 
policy objective has undergone fluctuations related to those in economic theory paradigms and in 
economic policy-making, against the background of the generalised increase in inflation in the 70s 
and the return to more orthodox policies in the 80s. For the purpose of this paper it should be 
borne in mind that these debates took place in Europe in a context of increasingly stable exchange 
rate regimes in which German monetary policy played a central role as an anchor for price 
stability. In a world of generalised floating, European countries showed a strong reluctance to float, 
which is easy to understand given that excessive exchange rate volatility was seen as a threat to 
the deepening of the common market, the most highly valued European achievement. But the 
process was neither harmonious nor devoid of crises. The tensions between domestic policy 
objectives and external constraints led occasionally to volatility and market turmoil. But little by little 
European countries other than Germany -the anchor of the ERM- adopted price stability as the 
basic goal of monetary policy, as awareness increased that price stability was a prerequisite for 
sustained economic growth.  
This explains why, when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted in the late 80s, macroeconomic stability 
became a basic element of both convergence towards monetary union and the economic policy 
framework of EMU. Price stability became the fundamental goal of an independent European 
Central Bank; sufficient convergence in inflation rates was a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for countries joining EMU; and a stability and growth pact was added as an element to 
ensure fiscal discipline among member countries. 
In this sense, the institutional framework reviewed in section two aimed at ensuring 
macroeconomic stability in Europe is unique in the world. This is particularly relevant concerning 
the incentives for peripheral countries to achieve and maintain nominal stability. These countries, 
which tend to have a higher growth potential than core countries, have traditionally been limited in 
their economic progress by their propensity towards instability, which has periodically induced 
crises and reversals in their progress. 
The incentives peripheral EU countries faced to pursue stability-oriented economic policies were 
particularly strong in the run-up to EMU. The convergence criteria played a very important role in 
pushing policies in peripheral countries onto the stability track, as evidenced in graph 2A. Not only 
were these countries required to keep inflation low, but also to maintain sound public finances, 
long-term interest rates below a certain threshold and a stable exchange rate, the two latter criteria 
implying that nominal convergence should not only be achieved in terms of contemporary inflation 
rates, but also be viewed by financial markets as balanced and sustainable.  
It is worth noting that this sort of external framework is currently benefiting the accession countries 
of Eastern Europe on their course towards the EU, and this will be more intensely the case in the 
coming years. . On the contrary, the advantages of this set-up do not apply to Latin American 
countries, which highlights the merits of the progress made in their case. For the purposes of this 
paper it is important to note, however, that nominal convergence requirements were not so 
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different in both areas, in that the markets were in any case the judges of convergence. In the 
case of the EU, countries with good policies will be rewarded with low long-term rates and stable 
exchange rates and, once in EMU, this virtuous circle will be additionally driven by convergence 
towards the lowest real interest rate (as actually occurred). Although EMU’s institutional framework 
is inapplicable to Latin America, fulfilment of the convergence criteria by EU peripheral countries 
played an analogous role to that represented today by the achievement of the investment grade 
rating by Latin American countries. The policies pursued in both cases were similar, as were the 
rewards, the main differences being that EMU “locks in” some of the gains (but only to a certain 
extent; losses of competitiveness would penalise countries with bad policies in EMU as well) and, 
more importantly, it also locks in expectations, reducing uncertainty. Furthermore, EMU provided a 
focus point and triggered a momentum towards nominal stability in Europe that Latin American 
countries do not have. 
As already explained in section 2, another interesting aspect of nominal convergence in EMU is 
the role played by emulation in creating the incentives for the right policies in peripheral countries: 
the costs of indiscipline rose perceptibly as an increasing number of countries achieved nominal 
stability. Certain arrangements for the surveillance of economic policies (BEPG, Stability and 
Growth Pact…) also showed the importance of “peer pressure” among EU countries as a 
disciplining device. This element is only very indirectly present in the case of Latin America. 
Countries which pursue the right policies are expected to be rewarded by international financial 
markets, benefiting from lower costs of financing and more capital inflows (a very strong incentive 
in a region so dependent on foreign capital). Thus, by creating a sort of competition for foreign 
funds, a certain kind of positive emulation may appear. Yet it is also possible that countries with 
undisciplined policies may seek a comparative advantage by resorting to competitive depreciations 
or devaluations, thus inducing contagion to other countries. There is a risk therefore of “negative 
emulation”, as a result of contagion from crises via the exchange rate being prevalent as 
compared to “positive emulation” via international financial markets rewarding the countries 
following sounder policies. 
As mentioned above, the exchange rate anchor was instrumental in facilitating nominal 
convergence for European peripheral countries, despite tensions, drawbacks and volatility in 
certain periods. In the case of Latin America, the exchange rate regime has been one of the most 
difficult -and often controversial- aspects of convergence efforts. Countries in the region have 
attempted to use the exchange rate anchor as a tool to achieve nominal stability. It proved useful 
in some cases for a certain period, but in the second half of the 90s it became clear that explicit 
unilateral exchange rate pegging regimes are extremely vulnerable to destabilising capital flows.  
The lesson European countries learned in the early 90s with the EMS crisis was similarly taught in 
Latin America a few years later. But one key difference is that, whereas European countries were 
able to achieve de facto exchange rate stability after 1995, thanks not only to sound and 
convergent policies, but also to the stabilising impact of EMU expectations, Latin American 
countries, without such an anchor, were subject to destabilising capital flows and in general moved 
to floating regimes with an internal anchor in the form of inflation targeting (or to dollarisation in a 
few cases). It is difficult, and to some extent futile, to assess which of the multiple current 
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exchange rate strategies best serves the stability goal; what actually matters is that the whole set 
of macroeconomic policies should consistently and decisively pursue this objective, so as to attain 
a stable environment and to achieve a positive verdict from the markets. 
Fiscal policy is another “pillar” of a stability-oriented economic policy. In Europe there is a 
framework to ensure fiscal discipline, but in the Latin America area, as mentioned in section 3, a 
number of factors led to a pro-cyclical pattern in the fiscal stance. Mechanisms for granting a more 
stabilising role for fiscal policy are essential to reduce cyclical swings and ensure permanent gains 
in terms of nominal stability. 
In Europe, as well as in Latin America and other emerging markets, crises were often rooted in an 
inadequate policy mix. Loose fiscal policies in countries engaged in a real and nominal 
convergence process overburden monetary policy and lead to very high interest rates, which 
attract capital inflows. In the ERM, the existence of a very credible upper floor for traditionally 
“weak” (peripheral) currencies limited the scope for a nominal exchange rate appreciation, but 
competitiveness deteriorated steadily as a result of persistent inflation differentials. It is worth 
keeping in mind that the ERM was by far the strongest mechanism for exchange rate stabilisation 
that has ever existed after the move to floating in the early 70s, due to its formal multilateral 
nature, the prescribed symmetry of intervention obligations and the existence of financing 
mechanisms for interventions. And, despite this, the ERM was subject to very strong pressures 
and had to resort after the 1992-93 crises to the widening of its bands. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that maintaining unilateral exchange rate pegs has been so difficult in emerging markets 
in the second half of the 90s. When imbalances in real exchange rates and the current account 
accumulate, a crisis becomes unavoidable. In some cases, an inappropriate sequencing of 
liberalisation of the capital account exacerbated these problems, by increasing vulnerability to the 
shifting mood of international capital markets. 
An important lesson, however, both from the European and the Latin American cases, is that even 
when the policy mix is balanced and the sequencing of liberalisation is adequate, countries and 
currencies are exposed to volatile capital flows, partly for exogenous reasons, such as changes in 
the appetite for risk of players in international financial markets. Therefore, developed domestic 
financial markets act as a buffer for external financial shocks. The deeper they are, and the lower 
the dependency on external capital flows, then the less countries would suffer from such volatility. 
In this regard, Latin American countries’ insufficiency of saving and strong dependency on external 
financing render them extremely vulnerable to such reversals in international capital flows.  
The differing relevance of the supranational institutional framework has been identified as a key 
difference between both regions. Clearly, the institutional elements of the European process that 
have helped peripheral countries in their drive for convergence are missing in Latin America. But in 
no way does this imply that convergence occurs without any effort. Countries need to assume the 
stability objectives and policies need to be supported by the population. Even in EMU, and given a 
stability-oriented monetary policy, low inflation rate differentials do not come about automatically 
as a result of the mere existence of a single currency. Stability-oriented policies need to be 
pursued in any economic regime. But the incentives in EMU for adopting a framework conducive 
to price stability are, admittedly, particularly strong. In this regard, and although such processes 
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are necessarily slow, closer trade integration in Latin America might over time incorporate 
institutional elements akin to those of the EU. In that case this avenue would have to be pursued 
with perseverance, sustained political resolve and clear popular support.  
Europe used many instruments and devices to help achieve nominal stability: co-operative 
exchange rate arrangements, convergence criteria for EMU, legislation enshrining price stability at 
the core of EU policy targets, and other institutional mechanisms to impose sound fiscal policies 
like the stability pact. All these mechanisms help achieve and maintain low inflation and may under 
certain circumstances reduce the cost of doing so. But they do not replace the basic prerequisite 
of political consensus and social support as the main conditions to achieve nominal stability. 
Stability policies always require sacrifices in the short term and entail certain costs, which are only 
feasible with sufficient support from the majority of the population. Transparency, a clear 
communication policy and a constant effort to explain the advantages of a sound and stable 
economic environment to the population are in any case necessary, and cannot be replaced by 
institutional devices or international suprastructures. Although the supranational umbrella has 
sometimes been used in the EU as a useful lever to impose unpopular policies, it is very risky to 
abuse such a strategy, since it can turn against the European project itself, to the extent that the 
citizens might ultimately identify the European project with the reiterated imposition of unpopular 
policies.  
From the above it is obvious that the lack of an external lever to impose stability policies calls for 
stronger political commitment and deeper-seated social backing in Latin America, both these 
being very demanding in countries where social needs are often huge. Latin America has, 
however, one advantage in this regard: that the population are aware of the very high costs of 
exuberant policies (monetary or fiscal), because they have often paid the price for them in the 
past.  
But are there any devices that can play a role in Latin America similar to that played by the EU 
institutional structure in the case of the European periphery? IMF programmes have been 
suggested as a substitute. To what extent can the IMF in Latin America play the role the EU 
institutional umbrella has performed for peripheral countries? The analogy cannot be taken too far. 
One key difference is the fact that IMF programmes are applied to countries in an already difficult 
situation, and cannot be regarded as a convergence tool in normal situations. “Ownership” of the 
strategy is another issue: the EU institutional setting has been adopted by all the member 
countries and is enshrined in their constitutions, whereas IMF programmes are often seen as 
externally imposed. The balance between conditionality of Fund financing and ownership of the 
programmes by the country is one of the basic questions of international financial architecture, 
which is still under discussion. For all these reasons, it is difficult for them to replace the sort of 
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external anchors as those used by peripheral European countries19.  
Perseverance in nominal stability (and reform) is pivotal to maintaining a sound environment, but 
continuous political resolve and social support are also required, all the more so when there is no 
supranational umbrella, like in Latin America, as argued above. Adequate institutional devices , 
such as an independent central bank, no monetary financing, prudent fiscal norms20, mechanisms 
ensuring compatibility between fiscal federalism and discipline, transparency, etc. may help in 
creating an environment conducive to nominal stability. 
One lesson from the 80s and 90s, in Europe and elsewhere, is that the flexibility of markets and 
adaptability to changing circumstances are also essential ingredients of price stability. The 
dilemma between stability and efficiency as policy objectives is a false one, as there is no 
substitutability between them in the long term; on the contrary, they tend to reinforce each other, in 
the sense that for stability to be preserved, the economy should be able to adapt to the changing 
pattern of demand in increasingly globalised markets. Furthermore, an open, competitive and 
efficient economy is the best means to ensure price stability. And conversely, a stable macro 
environment is crucial for maintaining efficiency. The increasing consensus on this approach led 
many countries in Europe and in Latin America to focus increasingly on structural reforms as a 
key ingredient of stability-oriented policies. 
For peripheral and emerging markets to be able to compete in a globalised economy, an 
appropriate stock of human and capital infrastructure is essential. Otherwise it would be 
impossible for them to compete with “core” countries21. Public spending policies play a crucial role 
in this regard, but for the fiscal effort to be undertaken without deteriorating external financial 
constraints, a sufficient fiscal base is needed. EU peripheral countries made a considerable effort 
in this regard, partly with financial support from EU resources, but mostly thanks to their own 
effort, which required far-reaching fiscal reforms. This element is weak in Latin American 
countries, which calls for relatively ambitious fiscal reforms, aimed at enhancing equity and 
increasing social cohesion. Investment in infrastructure and education will boost growth 
possibilities and long-term productivity. 
As mentioned above, a deep, sound and resilient financial sector is also essential to cope with 
external vulnerability. In particular, policies geared to fostering saving would reduce the strong 
dependency of Latin American countries on external financing. The recent development of private 
pension funds is encouraging in this respect. 
In labour market reforms, European countries (including the periphery) are embarked on a 
process of flexibilisation, which is expected to allow them to reduce an unemployment rate clearly 
                                                
19 It should be noted that some novel devices such as the IMF’s Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs), which are granted to 
countries that demonstrate the health and stability of their economic situation through the fulfilment of quite stringent 
economic requirements, , may play a somewhat analogous role to the convergence criteria in Europe. However, CCLs 
have not been sought by the target countries in Latin America, due to the fear that they are interpreted as signalling 
underlying weaknesses. 
20 See Von Hagen (1996) 
21 See Krugman (1995) 
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higher than other industrial areas. Latin American countries are in general characterised by a dual 
labour market, with a very flexible informal sector and a very rigid formal sector. Reforms of the 
latter in the direction of greater flexibility should keep pace with a more inclusive regulation of 
essential aspects of the former. 
Concerning structural aspects it is important to remember that, as in the case of nominal stability 
policies, the European framework helps consolidate them and keep the legal and institutional 
framework stable. In this regard, it tends to protect peripheral EU economies from the risks of 
reversals in the legal and institutional structure, a protection which is much more complicated in 
the Latin American case.   
Real convergence results show that ten years of reform in Latin America, in some cases 
acceptably implemented, have not been enough to place the region on a sustained track for 
growth. Coupled with the recent financial crises and the failure to reduce income inequalities, this 
has created a certain sense of disappointment in the region. Other aspects allow for more 
optimism. The degree of macroeconomic stability achieved is a cornerstone for growth; reforms 
take a long time to entrench and may have adverse effects on performance in the short run, but 
the evidence shows that they improve growth potential and that those countries which decisively 
pursue them, such as Chile or Mexico, can achieve a sustained path of growth in the medium run. 
All in all, it is apparent that an extra effort is needed in Latin America, relative to Europe, to attain 
the fruits of reasonable policies. Some key elements that have contributed to the success of the 
European periphery are not applicable to Latin America. But the most important lesson from 
Europe is that there is no substitute for the sustained pursuit of policies aimed at achieving macro 
stability and improving the efficiency of the economy, and that popular support is essential for such 
policies to be successful. A strengthening of domestic economic and financial institutions, a 
persistent commitment to macro stability and a perseverant strategy aimed at fostering the 
efficiency and attractiveness of these economies to foreign capital as well as at improving social 
cohesion are some of the main elements of this strategy. 
Annex 1: steps to monetary union22 
1. In 1952 France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries set up the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), the first common market for a limited number of products.  
2. On 27 March 1957, the six ECSC countries signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the 
European Economic Community. Over a period of 12 years, a common market was to be 
created, starting with the gradual abolition of customs duties within the Community and the 
introduction of common tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The second objective was the free 
movement of capital and persons. In order to realise these aims various institutions with 
supranational powers were set up, such as the European Commission, which is the EEC’s 
                                                
22Based on Van Bergeijk, Berndsen and Jansen (2000) 
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executive body, the Council of Ministers, which decides on European legislation, and the 
European Parliament, which has mainly advisory and monitoring powers. The EEC was 
launched on 1 January 1958. Also, an important aspect of the Treaty of Rome was that it also 
provided the basis for further co-operation in the monetary field. 
3. In 1970, the Werner Plan for creating an Economic and Monetary Union was presented. 
Under the plan, the union was to be set up over a period of ten years. Initially, exchange rate 
fluctuations would to have to be contained and the first steps would be taken towards the co-
ordination of monetary and fiscal policies. In the last stage, the currencies were to be locked 
together, and a monetary and budgetary authority would determine monetary and economic 
policy. But differing views in Germany and France about the way forward resulted in an 
abandonment of the plan. 
4. In March 1972, the EEC Member States decided in Basle to adopt margins of at most +2 ¼ 
per cent between their currencies, and to provide one another with intervention support for 
their currencies and no longer in dollars. This compelled the central banks to co-operate more 
closely. It was the birth of the snake in the dollar tunnel. In 1973, The European Monetary 
Co-operation Fund (EMCF) was set up to provide intervention support.  
Partly because the oil crisis hit some countries harder than others, currencies were continually 
leaving the snake, to re-join some time later. In 1973 the snake decoupled from the dollar. 
That year, it was decided that a “European Summit” of the Heads of State or Government, i.e. 
the European Council, be held every six months to boost political convergence. The lack of 
convergence of the economic and monetary policies of Germany and France, in particular, 
gave rise to diverging developments in inflation rates, and thus continued to fuel pressures in 
the foreign exchange markets. 
5. Continuing foreign exchange unrest compelled the Member States to work more towards 
monetary co-operation. During the Copenhagen summit of 1978, a committee of senior civil 
servants from Germany, France and the United Kingdom was called on to draw up a concrete 
plan. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Giscard d’Estaing took the 
initiative to boost co-operation at least on the foreign exchange front. This resulted in the 
European Monetary System (EMS) which took off on 13 March 1979. It was a new system of 
fixed but adjustable exchange rates, meant to create a zone of monetary stability although it 
was not intended to be a stepping-stone towards economic and monetary union. Only the UK 
did not join from the outset. One of the novelties of the EMS was the introduction of the 
European currency unit, the ECU. Many capital-account restrictions remained in force. Nor was 
there an agreement to eliminate national policy differences. Fiscal policies and inflation rates 
continued to diverge substantially in the early 1980s. Germany favoured a stability-oriented 
policy, while France pursued an expansionary policy. As a result, the EMS, like the snake, had 
to cope with many realignments in its early phase. 
6. The year 1983 may be seen as an important turning point in the history of the EMS. France 
made a U-turn when the authorities decided to give priority to a stable exchange rate between 
the French franc and the Deutschmark as a way of enhancing price stability, as in Germany. 
7. In 1985, France and Germany presented a joint proposal for greater political co-operation. 
During an Intergovernmental Conference that same year, the Community’s ten Member States 
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(Greece had joined in 1981) agreed on the necessary Treaty amendments, to be laid down in 
the Single European Act. It was of utmost importance that majority voting should be 
reinstated for decisions concerning a wider range of issues. In 1986, Spain and Portugal 
became EC members. The European Commission published a White Paper on which trade 
barriers (physical, technical and fiscal) still needed to be removed before the Single Market 
could be completed by end-1992. It was furthermore decided to abolish the remaining capital-
account restrictions in 1990. Now it was time for a more dynamic approach to the completion 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
8. At the 1988 Hannover summit it was decided that stage one of EMU would commence on 1 
July 1990. A committee made up of central bank governors, chaired by Mr Delors, then 
President of the European Commission, was given a mandate to draw up concrete proposals 
to that end. The Delors Report (1989) made a proposal for irrevocably fixed exchange rates, a 
single monetary policy, a European system of independent central banks, and a European 
Central Bank striving for price stability. So far the plan was very much like the 1969 Werner 
Plan. EMU was to be realised over a period of years. 
9. Stage One of Economic and Monetary Union aimed to strengthen both monetary and non-
monetary co-operation within the existing framework. This stage formally commenced on 1 
July 1990. Any remaining capital-account restrictions were abandoned in most Member States 
although four member states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) were allowed a transitional 
period until the end of 1992. In order to achieve an area without borders by 1 January 1993, it 
was agreed to adjust value added taxes and excise duties. A year later the European 
Economic Area (EEA) was created, under which Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and 
Austria joined the free single market of the European Community. This structure enabled the 
free flow of goods and services, capital and people within Europe without altering the acquis 
communautaire (the body of legislation) of the European Community. However, practically 
speaking it took until the end of 1997 before passport controls at intra-EU borders were lifted 
under the Schengen agreement. 
10. Stage two of EMU (1994): economic convergence. One goal of Stage Two of EMU was to 
prepare the establishment of the European Central Bank by creating the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI). Another goal of Stage Two was to achieve economic convergence between the 
Member States following the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty (signed in February 1992 
and effective from November 1993). Under the terms of the Treaty, the Member States 
committed themselves to seeking to reduce excessive deficits during Stage Two. Member 
States would have to fulfil so-called convergence criteria before adopting a single currency in 
Stage Three of EMU. This requirement was combined with the notion that Stage Three would 
start in 1999 at the latest, with however many Member States might have satisfied the criteria 
by that time. 
11. Stage Three of EMU: the exchange rates were irrevocably fixed on the last day of 1998, 
enabling the monetary union to be launched on 1 January 1999. The euro was established as 
the single currency for 11 European Countries and the monetary policy of the ECB began 
operating.  
12. 2002: Introduction of the euro notes and coins 
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